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American Jurisprudence between the VWars:
Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.

DURING the I930's the American legal profession became the forum for one of
the most bitter and sustained intellectual debates in the nation's history. A new
generation of legal scholars, inspired by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and
attempting a scientific study of law, was developing a sweeping critique of American jurisprudence that went far beyond the criticisms of such sociological jurists
as Roscoe Pound and Benjamin N. Cardozo. By I930 their stinging attacks on
established legal conceptions had alarmed traditional-minded jurists and within

a few years had raised distressing questions from the standpoint of democratic
theory about the nature and basis of law. The frightening challenge of totalitarianism in the late thirties moved the debate out of the realm of mere juristic
speculation and gave it a tone of urgency and crisis.
The new legal criticism developed out of the same intellectual environment
that generated new attitudes throughout American intellectual life. The increasing
prominence of the physical sciences, at least since the time of Charles Darwin, had
been convincing more and more individuals that knowledge of the physical world

and of human beings themselves could only be attained through the use of the
scientific method. By the beginning of the twentieth century the pragmatism of

William James and especially of John Dewey had provided a broad philosophy

that attempted to explain the human and social meaning of science and that
suggested how the scientific method could be employed to understand and resolve
human problems on all levels. Large numbers of American thinkers in many
diverse fields began to adopt a more empirical, experimental, and relativistic atti-

tude toward the problems and guiding assumptions of their disciplines. The impact of science and pragmatism, together with the desire for the improvement of
man's social and political life that many intellectuals shared, brought new vitality,
ideas, and methods to the expanding social sciences.
Through such approaches as functionalism and behaviorism, American psychologists were striving to make their discipline experimental; the new science
began to play an increasingly prominent role in the social thought of the twentieth
-After receiving his doctorate in 1968 from the University of Wisconsin, where he worked under
Irvin G. Wyllie, Mr. Purcell taught for two years in an experimental interdisciplinary program at the
University of California, Berkeley. He is now a visiting assistant professor at the University of
Missouri. His essay, "Ideas and Interests: Businessmen and the Interstate Commerce Act," Journal of
American History, LIV (Dec. 1967), won the Organization of American Historians' Pelzer Award for
1967.
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century. By offering to explain the sources and nature of human

chology promised to bring the elusive human factor under control an
social scientists to make their work wholly empirical. "The importance of the
rapid rise of psychology in recent years," explained Edward S. Robinson, a

psychologist working with the Yale University Law School, "is that it supplies
a background for a natural science of society which has hitherto been lacking."'
Because psychology seemed to answer an intellectual need that had grown acute

by the twenties, many social scientists turned toward its discoveries and theories
with renewed hope and enthusiasm.

Rejecting the prescriptive theories of classical economics, such scholars as
Thorstein Veblen and Wesley Mitchell studied production and distribution as
problems in the institutional behavior of individuals and groups. "Economics,"

Mitchell declared, "is a science of human behavior."2 Charles Merriam urged his
fellow political scientists to apply the discoveries of psychology and the other
social sciences to the study of politics, and along with many of his colleagues

produced closely detailed studies of the actual operations of governments, politicians, and pressure groups. Bronislaw Malinowski refined techniques of careful

observation and description in anthropological field work and developed a theory
of society based on the functional interrelationships of all parts of a culture.3

Throughout those disciplines the new empirical, experimental approach emphasized the importance of analyzing social phenomena in terms of functions and

behavior.
Along with the primary reliance upon scientific methods came a pervasive
epistemological and ethical relativism. Because valid knowledge had to be based
on empirical evidence, all a priori absolutes were unproven and unprovable. All

knowledge was necessarily tentative and subject to change. Since science supposedly dealt only with objective facts and was morally neutral, the one practically
reliable method of reaching truths was inoperative where questions of an ethical
nature were concerned. Although a few men such as Dewey maintained that the
scientific method could develop and substantiate moral values, most scholars in

the interwar decades were not convinced. The empirical documentation of widespread cultural relativism by anthropologists like Ruth Benedict confirmed the

relativistic trend, as did the analyses of the nature of historical knowledge by such
scholars as Carl Becker and Charles Beard. By the early thirties both Beard and

Becker were arguing that historical judgments could never be truly objective
because they were based on partial evidence, were not subject to experimental
testing, and were warped by the desires and beliefs of the historian. Value judg1 Edward S. Robinson, Law and the Lawyers (New York, I935), 49.

2 Wesley Clair Mitchell, "The Prospects of Economics," in The Trend of Economics, ed. Rexford
G. Tugwell (New York, 1935), 22.

3 For examples, see Charles Merriam, New Aspects of Politics (Chicago, I925); Bronislaw Malinowski, "Introduction," in Robert I. Hogbin, Law and Order in Polynesia-A Study of Primitive Legal

Institutions (2d ed., Hamden, Conn., I96I).
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ments, Beard concluded along with most of hi
'proved' by reference to historical occurrences or

While the basic attitudes of an empirical and

throughout most of American intellectual life,

slowly and haltingly. As late as the 1920'S the
claimed that judicial decisions were made on t
defined historically and applied mechanically. The

natural law served vaguely as the moral founda

actions, while Sir William Blackstone's statemen

many of the supposed first principles on which ju
old legal theory claimed that reasoning proceeded

and precedents through the particular facts of

function of the judge was to discover the prop

and to apply them to the case as first premises. On

could decide the case logically with certainty and u

In spite of its established predominance, how

already come under forceful attack by the beg

as i88i Justice Holmes, then a young lawyer in B

study of the common law, which he placed in an e

work. Holmes argued that practical expedients

conflicts of human society, were much more ce

than were any logical propositions. The Comm
Holmesian metaphor, the first cannon shot in
armies of legalistic formalism.

By I897 the basic outline of his scientific, rela

not an abstract problem of logic, but a practica

Judges did not in fact settle cases by deductive re

decided what was socially desirable according to

Those beliefs, like all moral values, were wholly

particular environment. The power of deductiv

absolutes that the method claimed to establish w

the actual working of the legal process. By the
no metaphysical truths or grand moral princip

"natural law," but only "the incidence of the publi

tality of the courts." The lawyer's sole duty was to

use that force, and hence to advise his clients mos
4 Charles A. Beard, The Discussion of Human Affairs (New York, I936), II9-20; see also id.,
"Written History as an Act of Faith," American Historical Review, XXXIX (Jan. I934), 2I9-29; Carl
L. Becker, "Everyman His Own Historian," ibid., XXXVII (Jan. 1932), 221-36; Ruth Benedict,

Patterns of Culture (New York, 1934).

5 See Roscoe Pound's original attack, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," Columbia Lat Review, VIII
(Dec. I908), 605-23; Edwin W. Patterson, jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law (Brooklyn,
N. Y., I953), 465-66; and Wilfred E. Rumble, Jr., American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform,
and the judicial Process (Ithaca, N. Y., 1968), 49-51.
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law in empirical, behavioral terms, Holmes urged his colleagues t

operations of the law" rather than its phraseology or moral connotatio

By the first decade of the twentieth century other scholars were be

follow Holmes's lead and to apply the insights of the new scientific, pragmatic
outlook. John Chipman Gray, a professor of law at Harvard University, stressed

the pre-eminent role of the individual judge as opposed to the logic of the law
itself in deciding particular cases. Louis D. Brandeis, and later Felix Frankfurter,

argued that judges must consciously consider the probable social results of their
decisions. Scientific studies of social needs and problems, rather than syllogistic

reasoning, should be the determining factor. To guide the judges in their assessment of those social results, both men employed briefs loaded with a maximum

of sociological evidence and a minimum of logical argumentation.7
Much of the theoretical justification for the "Brandeis brief" came from the

work of a young law professor at the University of Nebraska, Roscoe Pound, who
wrote a series of articles showing the need for and relevance of a new sociological

jurisprudence. "The sociological movement in jurisprudence," he explained in I908,
"is a movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of law."8 Agreeing with Holmes

that legal scholars must study the way laws operate in practice, Pound insisted that
the overemphasis on logical uniformity and theoretical certainty that characterized

much of the older approach often frustrated the just practical settlement of particular cases. Only by studying the social impact of legal principles and rules could

men know whether the law in fact brought about the administration of real justice. While Pound and Holmes agreed on many points, especially on the mechanical and abstract nature of the older legal theory, Pound's greater emphasis on

the ideal of justice conflicted with Holmes's more cynical view of moral values in
the law. Ultimately that difference would be one of the central reasons for Pound's

rejection of Holmes's disciples, who were to some extent also his own, in the i93o's.
It was thus in a rigid and formalistic profession that nevertheless had produced
a Holmes and a Pound, and in a broader intellectual environment that recognized
science as the method of reaching truth, that the so-called legal realists came of

age. Of a sample of twenty-two of the most important new critics only five had
been born before i88o, while eight were born during the i88o's, and nine after
i890. By I930 when their collective efforts were first termed "legal realism" their
average age was still only forty-two.9 Thus the realists formed a younger genera6 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law," in The Mind and Faith of justice Holmes:
His Speeches, Essays, Letters and judicial Opinions, ed. Max Lerner (New York, I943), 72, 76.
7 John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law (2d ed., Boston, I963), 99-IOI, I68-73.
For the "Brandeis brief," see the account in Robert E. Cushman and Robert F. Cushman, Cases in
Constitutional Law (New York, I958), 58o.

8 Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 609.
9 Eighteen of the twenty-two were taken from Karl Llewellyn's initial identification of those whom

he considered leading realists. (Karl N. Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism-Responding to
Dean Pound," Harvard Law Review, XLIV [June I93I], 1222-64.) The eighteen are Underhill Moore,
Herman Oliphant, Charles E. Clark, Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, Walter Wheeler Cook, Thomas Reed
Powell, Leon Green, Max Radin, William 0. Douglas, Hessel E. Yntema, Edwin W. Patterson, Arthur
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tion of scholars, less committed to what they rega
past and more willing to follow new methods and ideas. Having grown up with
the spread of the scientific outlook and the successful growth of the social sciences,

they readily accepted a critical, empirical attitude and hoped to apply it to the
study of the legal process. Facing the need to discuss the observed facts of judicial
behavior, many of the realists turned toward psychological theory for a scientific
framework within which to work.

While their pragmatic attitude made them hostile toward the older legal theory
and their age put them in the position of a new generation ready to criticize
established methods, the state of American law invited and even necessitated their
devastating attacks. The inconsistencies between the practices of a rapidly changing industrial nation and the claims of a mechanical juristic system had grown so
acute by the I920'S that in the minds of an increasing number of individuals the
old jurisprudence could no longer justify and explain contemporary practice. It

had become clear, Judge Cardozo declared in 1932, that "the agitations and the
promptings of a changing civilization" demanded more flexible legal forms and
demanded equally "a jurisprudence and philosophy adequate to justify the
change."'0
At the same time even many of the strict proponents of the old jurisprudence
had to admit that widespread confusion and uncertainty threatened the American

legal system. Such a stalwart of orthodoxy as Elihu Root acknowledged that "the
confusion, the uncertainty, was growing worse from year to year" and that as a
result "the law was becoming guesswork."" Root, like many other lawyers, found

the cause of confusion primarily in the massive growth of case law during the
previous decades. The whole case law system had, in fact, become unwieldy since
the I870's when the National Reporter system was inaugurated. At that time the
West Publishing Company had begun printing all federal court opinions through-

out the United States, in addition to all higher and some lower state court decisions. By the beginning of the twentieth century the National Reporter system
had turned the inevitably increasing number of cases into an avalanche of reported
precedents that made it impossible for judges to stay properly informed.'2 To their
L. Corbin, Wesley A. Sturges, Leon Tulin, Joseph F. Francis, Joseph W. Bingham, and E. G. Lorenzen. Biographical material was unavailable for two of Llewellyn's original twenty (Joseph C. Hutcheson and Samuel Klaus). Four other scholars (Walter Nelles, Thurman Arnold, Robinson, and Felix S.
Cohen) have impressed me as significant contributors to realism and have been added for that reason.
The list does not include such younger realists as Myres McDougal or Fred Rodell. Brief biographical
material on most of the realists is available in Association of American Law Schools, Directory of

Teachers in Member Schools (St. Paul, Minn., I922-4I).

10 Benjamin N. Cardozo, "Jurisprudence," in Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, ed.

Margaret E. Hall (New York, 1947), 8.
11 "Address of Elihu Root in Presenting the Report of the Committee," American Law Institute,

Proceedings, I (Pt. 2, 1923), 48, cited in Rumble, American Legal Realism, 156. On the growth of
case law, see also Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (New Haven, Conn., I924), I, 3-5,

I6.

12 Grant Gilinore, "Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure," Yalc Lawv fournal, LXX (June i961),

I040-41.
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great chagrin and bewilderment, members of the legal profession began unc
ing contradictory and conflicting decisions with ever-increasing frequency.
That plight was so widely recognized that in I923 Root and a number of his
orthodox colleagues helped establish the American Law Institute to abolish confusion by a clear and updated "restatement" of the law. The organization's first

report emphasized, in addition to the flood of precedents, a number of other
contributing causes of legal uncertainty, including a lack of precision in the use

of legal terms and a lack of agreement on basic common-law principles.13 For
many of the young critics the widely acknowledged confusion was clear evidence
that the syllogistic certainty of the law was a hollow claim and that the actual
role of the individual judge was much wider and more crucial than the older
jurisprudence allowed.

The very fact that the new American Law Institute was attempting a "restatement" of the law was an additional factor provoking the new critique. Such a
"restatement" assumed that law pre-existed in some whole form that could be
discovered by logical analysis and that the job of the American Law Institute was
merely to write it down. Most of the members of the institute still believed in the
validity of the older juristic method and thought that a more rigorous application

would resolve all difficulties. Convinced that law was a human product related to
changing social and cultural conditions, the new critics rejected the idea of an
official "restatement" as an impossible goal.'4

The practical experience of many of the realists served to strengthen their
awareness of the changing and subjective elements in the legal system. The great
majority of them had practiced law for at least a year before starting to teach, and
they were aware of the many individual, human factors that lay behind the actions

of lawyers and judges. They knew firsthand the conflicting and confused nature
of many precedents and rules. Such practical experience, as well as their pragmatic

outlook, helped lead many of them to hostility toward the older jurisprudence.
Recognizing the need both to understand the actual relationship between law and
a changing society and to explain the reasons behind contemporary practice, they

began their concerted though diverse probing for a new and scientific jurisprudence.

By the end of the twenties Yale, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins Universities
had become the centers of the new legal criticism. Charles E. Clark, who succeeded Robert M. Hutchins as dean of the Yale University Law School in I929,
brought such aggressive scholars as Jerome Frank, Walter Nelles, William 0.
Douglas, Thurman Arnold, and Robinson to New Haven. In cooperation with

Johns Hopkins University three of the most scientific-minded critics, Walter
13 Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the
Law, "The Law's Uncertainty and Complexity," American Law Institute, Proceedings, I (Pt. I, I923),

66-76.

14For a brief bibliography of the realist critique of the program of the American Law Institute,
see Rumble, American Legal Realism, 156, n. 40.
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Wheeler Cook, Herman Oliphant, and Hessel E.
oriented Institute of Law in I929. At Columbi

often regarded as the most important of the n
Patterson, Underhill Moore, and others in publ

weaknesses of traditional jurisprudence. Dean L

versity, Felix S. Cohen of the New School for S

University of California, Thomas Reed Powell o

Joseph C. Hutcheson of the United States Dist

those whose work placed them in the forefront o

The intense debate over legal realism as a coll

when Llewellyn and Frank, then an attorney p

separate essays that struck the legal profession in

the phrase "Realistic Jurisprudence" to describe

the term "legal realism" came to stand for the

critics. While most of the so-called realists dislike

upon it as an epithet to brand what they cons
dangerous attitude.

Llewellyn's article on "Realistic Jurisprudenc

between abstract legal verbalisms and concrete

approach is in terms of words; it centers on wo

edly, "it has the utmost difficulty in getting bey

concepts were simple devices to make the world m

of American law showed that those necessary a

appearance of solidarity, reality and inherent v

experience."'6 Hence they led to a rigidity that
to conform to outmoded concepts or else ignored

law was an exercise in painful definition and st

resemblance to the real world it was supposed t

Such an important concept as that of the lega

the danger and ambiguity inherent in rigid abstra

such authoritative rules were supposed to lead

were in fact so vague and confused as often to

talked of legal rules, no one knew whether the
court's; whether they represented what the cou

done in fact; whether courts actually followed
justify a decision reached on other grounds. Such

led to large-scale uncertainty and contradictio
massive and often absurd twisting of terms in

'5 Karl N. Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Ne
(Apr. 1930), 443.
16 lbid., 453.
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conceptual imprecision, Llewellyn concluded, could only mean "confus
and inevitable."17

He insisted that there was almost always a gap between the so-calle
case and its practical settlement. Admitting that legal rules had some uncertain
influence on judges, he resolutely maintained that a realistic study of the law

demanded an examination of the extent to which the rules actually controlled or
influenced the case. "You cannot generalize on this, without investigation,"
Llewellyn insisted. If men were ever to understand the legal system, they would
have to study individual cases empirically. "The significance of the particular

rule," he stressed, "will appear only after the investigation of the vital, focal
phenomenon: the behavior."'8
Llewellyn's empirical approach concentrated on behavior as the proper subject
of study for the legal scholar. Behavior was real, whereas most legal argumentation was simply verbal game playing. Following Holmes's lead, Llewellyn defined
law in terms of the coercive actions taken by government officials. Regardless of
syllogisms and definitions, the actual law was what the public force would sup-

port. "What these officials do about disputes," Llewellyn wrote in a sentence that
returned to haunt him, "is, to my mind, the law itself."'9 Using such a definition,
the whole legal process was clearly susceptible to empirical study. Again following
Holmes, Llewellyn declared that concepts of justice and ethical right had to be
ignored when the actual operations of the law were analyzed. Such concepts

merely confused the investigator by mixing considerations of "ought" where only
the realities of "is" were relevant. "The most fruitful thinking about law," he
remarked, "has run steadily toward regarding law as an engine (a heterogeneous

multitude of engines) having purposes, not values in itself."20
Accepting most of Llewellyn's ideas, Frank went far beyond them in earning
his reputation as one of the most extreme realists. Whereas Llewellyn believed

that rules and precedents were relevant and of some importance, Frank did not
even consider them a meaningful part of the law. To him law meant a particular
judicial determination upon a particular and singular set of facts. Reducing law

to what he considered an unequivocal empirical minimum, Frank equated it
solely with the specific individual judicial decisions. "Until a court has passed on
these facts," he insisted, "no law on that subject is yet in existence. "21
Rules and precedents were not part of the law because they had little if any
effect on actual judicial decisions. No one could reason out a decision by syllogism,
Frank declared. Instead judges had "hunches" about how cases should be decided
and then looked up the proper rules that would support their "hunch." "Judicial
judgments, like other judgments," Frank maintained, "doubtless in most cases,
17 Ibid., 439.
18 Ibid., 444.
19 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York, 1930), 12.

20 Id., "Realistic Jurisprudence," 464.

21 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (2d ed., New York, I963), 50.
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are worked out backward from conclusions tent

opinion was actually only the judge's rationaliza

his decision. Judges manipulated precedents in

their decision, they sought favorable precedents o

to support it. "What the courts in fact do," Fra
language of former decisions."23

As a result of realistic, empirical analysis of a
that the law was not a rational whole, nor eve

personal prejudices, judicial objectivity was fur

of relying on secondhand evidence concerning

parties to the case, and witnesses who distorted th

understanding, ignorance, or simple falsificat

thus necessarily elusive and essentially subjectiv

and necessarily partial and prejudiced. "To pre

on many a point," Frank argued, "is impossible.

In spite of the practical uncertainty and subje

lawyers and judges still insisted that law was
The explanation for that contradiction, he sug

"legal absolutist" mind. The father-child pattern

vidual's childhood, drove most men continually

figure which would act as a substitute for th
Because the law served as a natural authority f
consciously stimulated the latent childish emot

would seem to be justified in surmising that the s

which evokes, almost irresistibly, regressive emot

therefore, unconsciously developed an "absolu

see the law as a father-like authority figure, nece

tion. That subconscious drive prevented them f
of the legal system.

The manipulation of abstract concepts provi
lawyers and judges could construct a facade of

over the confused legal process. Referring to s

and "Scholasticism," he charged that the "absol

to convince themselves that all was well and to

considered concrete facts as the only important r

tions were merely escapes and delusions. "Virt

remarked, "seem to give to the metaphysician
22 Ibid., io9; see also ibid., II4-2I.
2 3 Ibid., I 5 9.

24 Ibid., 6.
25 Ibid., I9.
26 Ibid., 98.
27 Ibid., 65.
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Because the concepts were empirically empty-they did not bear a definite and
constant relation to any concrete reality-they were liable to all kinds of twisting

and reinterpreting. In such a way lawyers were able to reconcile completely
contradictory judicial decisions as "logical" under the same principle or precedent.
Although he declared that the great majority of men believed in the certainty
of law, Frank was primarily interested in, and hostile toward, traditional legal

theories and their contemporary advocates who controlled the bench and the

bar. Using a technique reminiscent of that of Veblen, Frank on several occasions
remarked in footnotes or appendixes that his psychoanalytic approach provided
only a partial explanation for the legal quest for certainty. But after making that
qualification in obscure places, usually he continued in the text to write as if
that approach were the only explanation. Indeed, while consistently proclaiming
lawyers and judges highly intelligent and learned men, he described them
throughout as immature, childish, and irrational.
The two works by Frank and Llewellyn had an immediate impact. Pound,
then dean of the Harvard Law School and the most renowned legal scholar in
America, responded early in I93I, ironically in an issue of the Harvard Law
Review dedicated to Justice Holmes on his ninetieth birthday. Although Pound

had earlier espoused many of the attitudes associated with realism, by 193I he
had become wary of some of the more radical implications of pragmatism and

positivism in the law. He was perhaps, in addition, moved to reply by the fact
that both Llewellyn and Frank had specifically attacked his work on juristic
theory. Undoubtedly having Frank most clearly in mind, Pound accused an
unnamed group of "realists" of allowing their naive faith in empiricism to lead
them into a philosophical nominalism that denied the existence of legal rules,
doctrines, principles, and concepts. They overemphasized irregularities and contradictions and ignored the uniformity and reasonableness of the law. By focusing

on subjective motives and behavior of judges, Pound asserted, the realists were
leading legal science into a dead end.28
Considering his attack unfair, Llewellyn and Frank replied jointly and
claimed that Pound's criticisms were almost wholly unwarranted. The importance
of the reply was that Llewellyn and Frank gathered together and defended
twenty of the better-known critics who, they explained, could be taken as a fair
sample of the new approach to the law. While emphasizing that the twenty
represented no "school" and were by no means in complete agreement in their
own attitudes, Frank and Llewellyn admitted that their criticisms of existing
legal theory gave them a unified approach. By the end of I93i the new critics

had been attacked and defended, and, most importantly, they had been personally identified and categorized.>
28 Roscoe Pound, "The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence," Harvard Law Review, XLIV (Mar. I93I),

697-711".

29 Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism," 1222-64. Although Llewellyn alone signed the
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While Frank alone had attempted a sweeping p
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absolutes as the bane of clear thinking, legal or
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government of laws rather than of men. While

and the United States Constitution-held that est
should be binding on free citizens, the realists

nonexistent and impossible to attain. Frank had

in administration and depended largely on the

particular judge who heard the case. "It is fant

"to say that usually men can warrantably act in rel

Frank based much of his analysis of the judic

Judge Hutcheson, who claimed that all judges reach

based on an "intuitive flash of understanding" t

in a case. He was referring, Hutcheson pointed o

the "logomachy" that the judge used to explain

way in which he decided a case. "The vital, motiv

he remarked, "is an intuitive sense of what is r

If that were the process of decision, then the so
of the judge were far more important than the

the law was clearly a subjective, changeable ph
Most of the new critics accepted an analysi
tried to base their legal theory on a subjective c

article, he explained that it had been conceived and researc
Llewellyn did the actual writing, Frank did not think he sho
30 Patterson, Jurisprudence, 548-52.
31 Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, 125.

32 Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., "The Judgment Intuitive: Th
Decision," Cornell Law Quarterly, XIV (Apr. I929), 285.

This content downloaded from 132.174.250.77 on Wed, 13 Dec 2017 11:33:39 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

American lJisprudence between the Wars 435

Radin emphasized the number of conflicting rules that pertained to any
In such a situation the judge was forced to decide cases on an expectation of

their probable social results. Since that meant a reliance on the judge's subjective
value standards, the process was actually a matter of personal motivation. "Judges,
we know, are people," Radin commented, and they thus make their decisions

like all other people.33 Yntema made the point even more explicitly: "The ideal

of a government of laws and not of men," he maintained, "is a dream."34 The
subjective motives of the judge, not the existence of rules, or even constitutions,
provided the key to understanding the law.
Morris R. Cohen, a philosopher at the City College of New York and a

leading critic of realism, pointed to the antidemocratic implication of such a

judicial theory. "To be ruled by a judge," Cohen declared, "is, to the extent th
he is not bound by law, tyranny or despotism."'35 When the realists claimed

that the judge's subjective decision was the only law, he implied, they were
justifying judicial despotism.

At that point, the theoretical force of the realist critique became clear, for
it rejected any concept of a higher law that could provide judges with objective,
rational guidance to assure a just operative law. A pervasive scientific relativism

that seemed to undermine any objective or absolute moral standard underlay
the realist approach. Llewellyn and Frank had both assailed abstract logic and
deductive rationalism and scorned the absolutes that those approaches generated.
Their determination to make concrete empirical facts the touchstone for all
analytical concepts seemed necessarily to exclude ideas of "ought" in favor of
facts about "is." If what men ought to do was not identical with what they
did in fact, then there was no basis in their approach for discussing moral concepts except as mere psychological data. It would, in any case, be impossible
to establish the objective validity of any such ethical values.

Some of the realists made their relativism explicit and direct. Cook, another
of the founders of the Institute of Law at Johns Hopkins University who had
been trained first as a physicist, looked enthusiastically to the physical sciences
for his legal inspiration. Scorning the futility of deduction, he emphasized that
human knowledge had "reached the era of relativity." By relativity, he explained,

he meant "a point of view, which, whatever may happen to specific doctrines,

seems destined to remain as a permanent achievement in human thought."36
Neither legal nor moral theory could escape that era.
Applying the scientific, relativist approach to the question of legal and moral
33 Max Radin, "The Tleory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think," American Bar Associa-

tion journal, XI (June 1925), 359.

84Hessel E. Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," Yale Law journal,

XXXVII (Feb. I928), 476.

85 Morris R. Cohen, "Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in the Law," Columbia Law Revie

XXVII (Mar. 1927), 244.

86 Walter Wheeler Cook, "Scientific Method and the Law," American Bar Association Journal, XIII

(June 1927), 305.
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standards, Moore, who taught first at Colu
similarly rejected the idea of absolutes: "Ultim

the stream of day dreams." Arguing for a prag
sisted that "human experience discloses no ultimates."37 Nelles, a professor at
Yale University, carried the approach to its extreme. "I deny ethical right and

ought without qualification," he declared in I933. He scorned the possibility of
both scientific and deductive ethics. "In the twentieth century," he remarked,

"popular feeling of the wickedness of denying ethical right and ought can no
longer command the unconscious deference of an important mind."38 In the
minds of most of the realists there could be no such thing as a demonstrable
moral standard.

The pragmatism and apparent ethical relativism of men like Cook, Moore,
and Nelles shocked much of the legal profession. Although the counterattack

did not reach its bitterest phase until after I935, it had clearly begun by the
early thirties. John Dickinson, one of Pound's leading disciples, and Hermann
Kantorowicz, a professor at the New School for Social Research, criticized the
realists for dismissing the importance of rules and pointed to the philosophical
difficulties in their approach.39 Hutchins, then president of the University of
Chicago, and Mortimer Adler, a prominent philosopher, joined the assault on
realism, basing their attacks on an Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. Rationally

knowable moral principles, not inchoate empirical facts, were the proper foun-

dation of jurisprudence.40 By excluding ethical considerations and reverting to
a philosophical nominalism, many scholars believed, the realists were necessarily
making force the only meaningful arbiter of human affairs and destroying the
ethical basis of democracy.

To harm the cause of democratic government was the last thing the realists

hoped to do. In attacking traditional abstractions and nonempirical concepts
of justice, they were usually assailing what they considered the practical injustices

of American society. Abstraction in economics and politics, as in the law, they

believed, had been one of the biggest obstacles to the attainment of a truly
democratic society. Frank, Oliphant, Clark, Arnold, Douglas, and Felix Cohen
were all ardent New Dealers who shared a strong hostility to the method of
juristic reasoning that struck down social welfare laws and wrought what they
considered great human injustices. Most of the other realists expressed equally
strong disapproval of the social and economic situation of the thirties. The new
37 Underhill Moore, "Rational Basis of Legal Institutions," Columbia Law Review, XXIII (Nov.
3923), 6I2.

38 Review of Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals, ibid., X
39 John Dickinson, "Legal Rules: Their Function in the Pro
Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register, LXXIX (May 1931), 833-68; Hermann
Kantorowicz, "Some Rationalism about Realism," Yale Law 7ournal, XLIII (June 1934), 1240-53.
40 Hutchins' most famous attack on legal realism appeared as "The Autobiography of an Ex-Law
Student," reprinted in No Friendly Voice (Chicago, 1936), 41-50; Mortimer Adler, "Legal Certainty," Pt. 2 of "Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium," Columbia L4w Review, XXXI (Jan.

1931), 82-115.
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criticism was thus not intentionally hostile toward the idea of democra
ernment. Indeed, after I932 it lent itself readily to the support of concrete
ical reform. As early as I93I Frank defended the realists against charges that

they excluded ethical considerations from the law. "The point is," he retorted,
"that the rational and ethical factors are thwarted in their operations by the

conventional tendency to ignore the non-rational and non-ethical factors."'" The
problem was not whether there was something abstract called justice, but rather
how human relations could be made more just in practice. Though the theoretical
problems the realists raised left them open to bitter attack, the obtuse formalism of
American constitutional interpretation throughout the first third of the twentieth

century helped drive them to their extreme positions. The manifest human needs
created by the depression further convinced them of the need for a more realistic
and flexible legal theory to attain what they considered a truly democratic society.
While the early critiques of legal realism tended to be mild and often discriminating, by I936 they were becoming wholly denunciatory. The tone of the
attack grew in bitterness in proportion to the spread of fear and uncertainty
created by the success of the totalitarian governments of Europe. As Americans

became more acutely aware of the despotic and repressive practices in Russia,
in Italy, and most especially in Germany, the great majority condemned them

in clear and forceful terms. As the possibility of another war drew nearer, they
clung more tightly to the ideal of democracy as the best and morally ideal form

of government. The realists had raised, unintentionally, fundamental questions
about the possibility and validity of democratic government at a time when the
country needed reassurance and conviction.

Inside the ominous framework constructed by the existence of the totalitarian

governments, a new extremism in the realist movement itself was working to

invite the bitter attack. In I935 Robinson and Arnold, who jointly conducted
seminars at the Yale University Law School on psychology and the law, published studies that assumed a sweeping ethical relativism. Robinson, who revealed
a marked antipathy toward traditional deductive juristic thought, argued that
the whole legal system should be reformed in line with the discoveries of modern
scientific psychology. Committed to a thoroughgoing empiricism, he charged

that "there is not now and never has been a deductive science of ethics."42 Moral
values developed, instead, out of concrete situations and were intelligible only
in that context. No absolute, abstract, or universal moral values existed.
Arnold went beyond Robinson's position and argued that abstract theories
and moral values were not only unfounded, but were wholly mythical. Moral
ideals served only as satisfying symbols for emotional needs and had no further
41 Review of Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, Yale Law Journal, XL (May 1931), 1121 n. For an

example of the relationship between legal realism and political reform, see Jerome Frank, "Modern

Trends in Jurisprudence," American Law School Review, VII (Apr. 1934), I063-69.

42 Robinson, Law and the Lawyers, 225; see also review of Harold Ernest Burtt, Legal Psychology,
Yale Law Journal, XLI (May 1932), IIo6.
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connection with anything real. The proper wa
Arnold explained, was to ignore them as "princ
simply "as symbolic thinking and conduct whic
in groups."43 In fact, he concluded, if theories w
symbols, they would have to be empirically fal

the validity of such ideals Arnold left no basis for

good or bad symbols or for establishing the leg
whatever. In his approach ethical values faded
existence.

Shortly after their two books were published, at a time when men could see
the rampant brutality of Nazism, the vigorous counterattack began its harshest

phase. Rufus C. Harris, dean of the Tulane University Law School, Philip
Mecham, a professor at the University of Iowa Law School, and Morris R. Cohen
all charged that realism paved the way for totalitarianism by denying objective

ethical standards and making law an amoral coercive force.44 Edgar Bodenheimer, an attorney in the Solicitor's Office in the Department of Labor, argued
the same line in his important work on jurisprudence. "There is a certain danger
that the skepticism of realistic jurisprudence may, perhaps very much against
the intents and wishes of its representatives, prepare the intellectual ground for
a tendency toward totalitarianism."45

The growing condemnation of realism reached a climax in I940 when two
of the most prominent legal scholars in the country, Pound and Lon L. Fuller

of Duke University, published lectures assailing the new movement. Pound
had long been critical of realism, and by I940 he was ready to name it a "giveit-up philosophy." Refusing to discuss the work of any particular individual, he

issued a blanket charge against them all: "The political and juristic preaching
of today leads logically to [political] absolutism."46 Fuller, like Pound, had
earlier shared some of the attitudes associated with realism, but by I934 he had
turned into a stalwart critic. Realism attempted the impossible, he argued, for
man could never ignore the ethical problems in the law, not even for the alleged
purpose of scientific scholarship. In the end realism "remains formal and sterile."

Such a negative attitude spreading through society was a major cause, he explained, "in bringing Germany and Spain to the disasters which engulfed those
countries.
43 Thurman Arnold, The Symbols of Government (2d ed., New York, 1962), Xiv; see also
ibid., I0, I7, 34, 98.

44 Rufus C. Harris, "Idealism Emergent in Jurisprudence," Tulane Law Review, X (Feb. I936)
I69-87; Philip Mecham, "The Jurisprudence of Despair," Iowa Law Review, XXI (May I936),
669-92; review of Robinson, Law and the Lawyers, Cornell Law Quarterly, XXII (Dec. I936),
17I-78; and review of Arnold, Symbols of Government, Illinois Law Revicw, XXXI (Nov. I936),

41 I-I 8.

45 Edgar Bodenheimer, jurisprudence (New York, I940), 3I6.
46 Roscoe Pound, Contemporary juristic Theory (Claremont, Calif., 1940), 9; see also ibid., i, 8-i I.
47 Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (2d ed., Boston, I966), 89, I22; see also ibid.,

4-6, II, 64-65.
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Though Pound and Fuller attacked realism vigorously, the most severe and
extreme attacks came from a number of Catholic legal scholars who during the
thirties helped to generate a resurgent Neo-Scholastic legal movement in the
United States. Much of the impetus came from the work of the American

Catholic Philosophical Association, which established a round table on philosophy

and law at its meeting in I933. In addition to sponsoring scholarly papers a
monographs, the round table attempted to organize a unified jurisprudence
among professors at all Christian church-related law schools in the country.
Although relatively few non-Catholics expressed interest, the suggestion drew
support from many Catholics who saw the situation as desperate.
As other critics had done, the Catholics pictured realism as ethical relativism
undermining the foundations of democracy. Those who adhered to such doctrines
as pragmatism and empiricism, as the realists did, declared Dean Clarence Manion

of the Notre Dame University Law School, were betraying the American citizen
and "preparing to sell him into slavery."48 Such dire predictions exceeded those of
most other critics, for many of the Catholics refused to qualify them in any
way. They saw such a definite and direct causal connection between ethical
relativism and totalitarianism that they seemed to believe in what has been
called the autonomy of ideas. Disregarding such factors as economic structures
and political institutions, they argued that the ideas associated with legal realism
and ethical relativism, by themselves, would lead naturally and inevitably away
from traditional democracy to a ruthless totalitarianism. "Godless Behaviorism
and Pragmatism are the headhunters, with Democracy and popular sovereignty
the victims," declared Father Francis E. Lucey, a regent of the Georgetown University School of Law. "Democracy versus the Absolute State means Natural Law

versus Realism."49
While the reaction against pragmatism and relativism was bitterest in the
legal profession, the attack spread through all areas of American intellectual life.
In the fields of history, philosophy, literature, and the social sciences many scholars
began pointing to the dangerous implications of scientific relativism and con-

demning their colleagues who had embraced some form of it. By I937 Walter
Lippmann had completely rejected his earlier pragmatism and condemned the
"aimless and turbulent moral relativity" of twentieth-century social thought.50
Hans Kohn, Lewis Mumford, Reinhold Niebuhr, Thomas Mann, Alvin Johnson,
48 Clarence Manion, "The American Metaphysics in Law," Proceedings of the American Catholic
Philosophical Association, XVIII (I942), 133-34. For examples of the Catholic critique, see Miriam
Theresa Rooney, "Law and the New Logic," ibid., XVI (1940), 192-222; Brendan F. Brown,
"Natural Law and the Law-Making Function in American Jurisprudence," Notre Dame Lawyer,
XV (Nov. 1939), 9-25; Frederick J. deSloovere, "Natural Law and Current Sociological Jurisprudence,"

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XVII (I94I), I37-42; Dietrich

von Hildebrand, "The Dethronement of Truth," ibid., XVIII (1942), 3-i6; and Paul L. Gregg,

"The Pragmatism of Mr. Justice Holmes," Georgetown Law journal, XXXI (Mar. I943), 262-95.
49 Francis E. Lucey, "Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective Contributions

to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society," ibid., XXX (Apr. 1942), 526, 533.

50 Walter Lippmann, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society (Boston, I937), 380,
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and Van Wyck Brooks were among those w
and relativists for the desperate state of world

must pave the way, not to maudlin regrets," th
"but to immediate atonement."'51

Although the critics of legal realism undou

titude directly threatened the existence of d

mated also by other social motives. Some crit

tives of the wealthy groups that had violent
and correctly understood the devastating rel

method of constitutional interpretation. One
example, came from a New York lawyer, Ra

in charge of the Legal Division of the Amer

charged in I94I that realism was "radically su

life," few could have doubted that he had sp
ment for a more permissive constitutional

tion.52 For those who already regarded the N
was no real distinction between attacking th

demning legal realism as antidemocratic. Rat

regimentation gave evidence to the charge again
and justified such regimentation.
There was a different ulterior motive behind

olics, who politically were generally sympa
lectual attitudes they associated with legal r
of religious faith and emotional conviction.
mentals was indissolubly linked with a hier

ability to interpret an absolutely true moral law

and reason. Realism and modern empiricism
Catholics began their assault in defense, not

racy, but of their faith and their Church. B

sophical conviction that such attitudes were fal

them with the practice of totalitarianism, whic

went so far as to identify American democr

philosophy. The "definite American philoso
writer, was "drawn directly from the Catholic

been considered not completely American, the C
their legitimacy by defining themselves as the

Revolution, and at the same time discrediti
versaries.54

51 Hans Kohn et at., The City of Man: A Declaration o
52 Raoul E. Desvernine, "Philosophy and Order in Law

Philosophical Association, XVII (I94I), 135-36.

58 William Franklin Sands, "What Is an American?" Commonweal, XXXIII (Feb. 21, I94I), 438.
4 See also Moorehouse F. X. Millar, "The Origins of Sound Democratic Principles in Catholic
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Whatever their motivations, the attacks had an effect. Much of the work

of the realists had slighted the importance of ethical theory. Their philosophical
assumptions had undermined the concept of a rational moral standard. Their

ethical relativism seemed to many to mean that no Nazi barbarity could be
justly branded as evil, while their identification of law with the actions of gov-

ernment officials gave even the most offensive Nazi edict the sanction of true
law. Juxtaposing that logic to the actions of the totalitarian states, the critics
had painted realism in the most ominous and shocking colors.

The damning charges forced the realists to assert their innocence. "I hope,"

declared Radin, "I have never said that ideas like wrong and right, or any
ideas, are worthless or meaningless terms."55 An empiricism that tried to predict
actual decisions was "an incomplete way to see law," Llewellyn admitted in

I940, for "the heart and core of Jurisprudence" was the problem of ethical purpose
in the law. "I for one," Llewellyn exclaimed, "am ready to do open penance for
any part I may have played in giving occasion for the feeling that modern
jurisprudes or any of them had ever lost sight of this."56 Frank, Yntema, Pat-

terson, and Felix Cohen all explicitly defended the realists against their critics,
arguing that they had never denied an ethical goal in the law.57 That defense
was only partially relevant, however, since the fundamental question was actu-

ally whether the basic philosophical and methodological assumptions that characterized realism left any rational basis for affirming the legitimacy of an
ethical goal.
Facing a barrage of criticism for his extreme views, Frank ultimately drew
closer to the natural law school than any of the other realists. During the early
forties he looked increasingly for the moral justification of democracy and seemed
to find it in the Thomistic concept of natural law. By i945 he was maintaining
that most Americans refused to accept the concept of natural law only because
of a confusion in terminology that gave them the wrong idea of its true meaning.
"Most intelligent Americans, if the 'basic principles' of Scholastic natural law are
described to them," he argued, "will find them completely acceptable."58 Three
Tradition," Catholic Historical Review, XIV (Apr. I928), I04-26, and "Scholastic Philosophy and
American Political Theory," Thought, I (June I936), II2-36; Raoul E. Desvernine, "The Creed
of Americanism," Notre Dame Lawyer, XVII (Mar. 1942), 2I6-26; Robert I. Gannon, "What Are
We Really Fighting?" Fordham Law Review, XI (Nov. I942), 249-54; Goetz Briefs, "Philosophy
of the Democratic State," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XV (1939),
36-50; and Patrick J. Roche, Democracy in the Light of Four Current Educational Philosophies
(Washington, D. C., 1942).

5 Max Radin, "In Defense of an Unsystematic Science of Law," Yale Law journal, LI (June
I942), I275.

56Karl N. Llewellyn, "On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence," C

XL (Apr. I940), 593, 603.

57Hessel E. Yntema, "Jurisprudence on Parade," Michigan Law Review, XXXIX (May I941),
II64-65; Edwin W. Patterson, "Forward," in Edwin N. Garlan, Legal Realism and Justice (New
York, 194I), viii; Felix S. Cohen, "The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence," Modern Law
Review, I (June 1937), 24-25; Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels: Some Aspects of Government

in a Democracy (New York, 1942), Appendix v, esp. 297-300.

58Jerome Frank, Fate and Freedom: A Philosophy for Free Americans (New York, I945), 295;

see also ibid., 98-99, 259-60.
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years later he made his position clear and unequ
how any decent men today can refuse to adopt, a
tion, the fundamental principles of Natural Law,

stated by Thomas Aquinas."59 Although Frank st

of the legal system and insisted on the uncertaint

tion of principles, he had come a long way from
of Law and the Modern Mind.

Llewellyn, too, moved in the direction of natural l

of Frank's enthusiastic acceptance. Although he
to Aquinas for the Schoolman's work on the philo
braced neither Thomism nor the whole doctrine
instead the general idea of a natural law, but tran
more intuitive concept. Natural law, he believed

universal human "urge" or "drive" for "right, o
than being the opposite of legal empiricism as m

declared, natural law was "an interesting and hig
While Llewellyn added a general concept of na
and emphasized the importance of proper ethica
true to his empiricism and retained a sharp skept

of deductive logic. "When it comes to ultimate sub

early in I942, "I repeat that I can find no clarity,

or of deduction as to specific matters, from the
found clear." If pressed for an ultimate justification

or for any values, he admitted, "I have no answer
In spite of their early leadership, neither Llewel

the other realists in the move toward natural law. R

the others. Acknowledging that realism must pla

considerations, he declared that "the lawyer's task

justice" and emphasized that "any legal teaching t

most of its point."63 But even with the modifica

mained a convinced empiricist with no use for abs

any other idea, he declared in I940, "has no object

only in the minds of men and was, therefore, on

that actual men subscribed to it. In that case the

juridical officials was the source of a community
"In the last analysis," Radin argued, "justice mus

of what a specific group-the judges themselves-t

59 Id., "Preface to Sixth Printing," Law and the Modern Mind, xx

60 Karl N. Llewellyn, "On the Good, the True, the Beautifu

Law Review, IX (Feb. I942), 247.
61 Id., "One Realist's View of Natural Law for Judges," Notre Dame Lawyer, XV (Nov. I939), 3, 8.
62 Id., "On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law," 264.

63Max Radin, "The Education of a Lawyer," California Law Review, XXV (Sept. 1937), 688.

64 Id., Law as Logic and Experience (New Haven, Conn., 1940), 156-58.
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justice was real, fundamental, and essential, but it was necessarily a changing
justice, wholly relative to the moral beliefs of the community in general and

of the judges in particular.
Thus, while the realists modified their tone and protested their innocence,
they did not, with the exception of Frank, give in to their critics on any fundamental point. They agreed that deduction was sterile in the field of values
and claimed that their critics were as unable as they were to demonstrate conclusively the ultimate validity of any ethical ideals. Most would have agreed
with Cook, who compared the advocates of deductive ethical systems to the
infants in John Watson's experiments who exhibited "fear reaction" when they
lost their sense of physical support. "They fear the loss of support of fixed principles which can be used automatically in cases of doubt," Cook charged, and
hence they struck out wildly at those who pointed to the limits of human reason
and suggested the true relativity to be found in reality.65
As most of the realists lost little of their confidence in science, so too they

lost little of their ability to retaliate. Pound's condemnation of realism in light

of his own earlier work, Yntema charged, "bears a tragic aspect of schizologic
aberration."66 Fuller's legal theory, Patterson pointed out, was marred throughout
by a pervasive ambiguity. "Surely the clarification of basic confusions does not
hamper the exercise of the creative reason," he commented dryly.67 Myres S.
McDougal, a young professor at Yale University, accused Fuller of "preaching
pseudo-inspirational sermons." The day would come, McDougal hoped, when
lawyers could be trained as scientific scholars "and not as priests in outworn
and meaningless faiths whether of 'law' or of 'ethics.' "68 Fred Rodell, another
of the younger realists, charged that all those legal thinkers who spoke in sacred

terms of some abstract "Law" had been "taught in mental goose-step."69 It
was only appropriate to the spirit of much of the debate that Walter B. Kennedy,
a leading Catholic scholar at Fordham University, returned the same charge in
I94I by calling realism a "goose-step philosophy."70
By 194I when America entered the Second World War, the bitter debate
within the legal profession had reached its most intense phase, and it revealed
a number of important facts about American thought in general and legal theory
in particular. Most important, the debate demonstrated the depth of a basic
split that divided two groups of American intellectuals who, for want of better

terms, might be called scientific relativists and rational absolutists. On the one
65 "Walter Wheeler Cook," in My Philosophy of Law: Credos of Sixteen American Scholars
(Boston, I94I), 64.
66 Yntema, "Jurisprudence on Parade," II63.

67 Review of Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, Iowa Law Review, XXVI (Nov. 1940),

I72-73.

68 Myres S. McDougal, "Fuller v. the American Legal Realis

Journal, L (Mar. 1941), 840.

69 Fred Rodell, Woe unto You, Lawyers! (2d ed., New York, 1957), 149.
70 "Walter B. Kennedy," in My Philosophy of Law, I5I-52.
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hand, the realists owed their inspiration and in
of ideas associated with modern science. Truth was wholly dependent on em-

pirically established facts and hypotheses, they agreed, and it was necessarily
tentative and relative. On the other hand, the absolutists, such as Hutchins, Adler,
and the Catholics, believed that human reason could discover certain universal
principles of justice by analyzing philosophically the nature of reality. Deductive

logic could demonstrate the truth of propositions and lead man to correct applications in settling particular, practical questions. The universal principles
formed for the absolutists the basis for all ethical knowledge, which was demonstrably certain.

These two fundamentally irreconcilable attitudes were in large part respon-

sible for the intensity and extremism in the debate. Since both sides started
from widely divergent assumptions, they were often unable to understand, let

alone sympathize with, their enemy's position. The realists saw rational absolutism as pointless and often subjected it to ridicule and scorn. Felix Cohen referred

to it as "Transcendental Nonsense," while Arnold and Frank compared it to
superstitious incantations chanted by witch doctors and faith healers. The rational absolutists returned the scorn in full, charging the realists with everything

from atheism to Communism to nihilism. As the realists were often unable to

understand how anyone could accept some of the canons of rational absolutism
in light of the discoveries of modern science and philosophy, their critics were

equally unable to see how any man could fail to accept that which was selfevident and necessary to give support to a universally valid ethical system. Such
a system was necessary, they continually insisted, if men were to condemn totali-

tarianism rationally. With each side committed to its own obvious truths and
faced with an implacable opponent, vilification and the questioning of motives

became an almost automatic recourse. Those who would not see must have
some hidden and unworthy purpose.

That deep division was also evident in the awkward positions taken by
Pound, Fuller, Morris Cohen, and a number of other critics of realism. Such
scholars knew the severe limitations of deductive logic and were committed
to some form of legal empiricism. At the same time, however, they saw many
of the theoretical problems realism created, and they agreed, when faced with
the challenge of totalitarian ideology and practice, that some supralegal moral
standard was necessary as the basis for ethical judgments. Torn between two
conflicting attitudes, they tried desperately to reconcile them or to develop a
coherent ethical position that would withstand the criticisms from both sides.
Fuller's concept of natural law, for example, placed him distinctly outside the
realist movement, but failed to bring him into any real philosophical agreement
with the Thomists. It was too abstract foir the one side and too positivistic for
the other.

The long debate also clearly revealed the plight of ethical theory in the middle
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of the twentieth century. The incisive criticisms of modern philosoph

dramatic impact of experimental science had made rational absolutism

in the minds of most educated Americans. Many were ready to conclu
moral justification in any ultimate sense was an impossible and meaningless
concept. "Having surrendered the quest for certainty," Cook insisted, quoting
Dewey, "we can offer no guarantees."'71 Though difficult to deny intellectually,

that conclusion was dissatisfying to most Americans at the time when Nazism
was perpetrating its outrages on both Germany and the rest of Europe.

The apparent success and spread of the totalitarian ideologies, backed by
military might, exacerbated the internal division in American thought and placed

the fundamental problem of the ethical basis of democracy into clear relief. The

barbarity and repression evident in the various totalitarian countries enraged
most American intellectuals. Feeling the deep need to condemn them in the
clearest and strongest terms, they were forced to deal in some way with rationally

based ethical judgments. That necessity created immense stress in the minds
of many who either doubted the possibility of such judgments or found themselves unable to produce them. Some, like Becker and Malinowski, turned on

much of their earlier work and argued that there were broad moral values that
in fact did support the ideal of democracy and that showed equally that totali-

tarianism was evil. Others, such as Percy W. Bridgman and Stuart A. Rice,
admitted that there was no ultimate ethical sanction for democracy and suggested only that human experience indicated that the great majority of men
preferred it to Nazism. Most intellectuals finally had to ignore their doubts and
the intellectual difficulties that plagued ethical theory and in the end simply assert
the evil of totalitarianism and the relative goodness and desirability of democracy.

Although the Catholics in contrast expressed great certainty in the power
of reason to discover ultimate principles, the debate revealed a defensive attitude
on their part that at times reached extreme proportions. In spite of their fervent

religious and intellectual convictions, they realized that they were fighting a
battle against the ever-strengthening intellectual trends of the past three hundred

years. Abstract rationalism simply could not stand against the combined forces
of pragmatism, scientific empiricism, and modern critical philosophy. The vitriolic

tone and extreme, unfounded accusations made against such movements as legal
realism showed clearly the sense of intellectual frustration and institutional anxiety

that underlay Catholic legal thought in the 1930's. The identification of realism
and relativism with totalitarianism was the ground on which the Catholics hoped
to make their belated victorious stand against the intellectual forces of the twen-

tieth century. Though they had some limited success during the time of most
severe intellectual crisis in the late thirties and early forties, their counterattack

failed, and the Catholics themselves eventually modified some of their more
strident positions.
71 "Walter Wheeler Cook," 64.
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Finally, the debate suggested the course that Am
take in the years after the Second World War. Wh

grew somewhat in importance-and certainly prove

as trying war criminals-through the late forties an

again and became mainly an isolated and parochial
support outside of a few Catholic law schools. Where it did have vitality it was

made part of a broader empirical synthesis as in the work of F. S. C. Northrop.
While ignoring some of its more extreme theoretical tendencies, the profession
generally accepted many of the ideas associated with legal realism. That move-

ment helped establish the importance of factual research in law, the necessity
of empirical studies of the legal process, the legitimacy of a more flexible con-

stitutional interpretation, and the acceptance of a pragmatic, operational concept

of law. In spite of the problems the realists presented, both philosophically and
legally, they were pointing toward the future by suggesting fruitful courses of
study and more useful methods of analysis. The alliance the realists helped forge
between legal theory and empirical analysis fortified the trend toward sociological

jurisprudence that had begun forty years before and that was to become a commonly accepted part of American law in the years after the Second World War.
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